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YEARWORTH v. NORTH BRISTOL NHS TRUST: 
A PROPERTY/MEDICAL CASE OF UNCERTAIN SIGNIFICANCE? 
 
Shawn H.E. Harmon♠ 
 
(2010) 13(4) Medicine, Health Care & Philosophy 343-350 
 
Abstract: It has long been the position in law that, subject to some 
minor but important exceptions, property cannot be held in the human 
body, whether living or dead.  In the recent case of Yearworth and 
Others v North Bristol NHS Trust, however, the Court of Appeal for 
England and Wales revisited the property debate and threw into doubt a 
number of doctrines with respect to property and the body.  This brief 
article analyses Yearworth, (1) reviewing the facts and the Court’s 
decision with respect to the originators’ proprietary and contractual 
interests in their body and bodily products, (2) considering the 
significance of relying on property and its use a legal metaphor, (3) 
questioning the scope of the property right created, and (4) querying 
whether an alternate conceptual approach to extending rights and a 
remedy was warranted.  It concludes that, while Yearworth engages 
with, and impacts on, important theoretical and practical issues – from 
legal, healthcare and research perspectives – it does not offer a great deal 
of guidance and, for that reason, its precedential significance is in doubt. 
 
Keywords: medicine and healthcare – law – property – body tissues and 
products – negligence 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
It has long been the position (in law) that property cannot be held in the undivided 
human body, whether living or dead.1  In the UK, this orthodox view was expounded 
in the seventeenth century,2 and reiterated thereafter in R v Lynn (1788), R v Sharpe 
(1857), Foster v Dodd (1867), R v Price (1884), and Williams v Williams (1881-85).  
More recently, in R. v Bentham (2005), the House of Lords held that a person does not 
‘possess’ his body or any part of it.3  This prohibition has also largely obtained with 
                                                 
♠  Research Fellow, INNOGEN, ESRC Centre for Social and Economic Research on Innovation 
in Genomics, University of Edinburgh, and SCRIPT, AHRC Centre for Research on Intellectual 
Property and Technology Law, University of Edinburgh. 
1  With respect to living bodies, see Matthews (1982), who noted that interference with a living 
body is an invasion of a personal (not a proprietary) right.  With respect to dead bodies, see Haynes 
Case (1614), 77 ER 1389, and Sir Edward Coke, Institutes of the Laws of England (1641), 3-203, who 
stated, “The burial of the cadaver (that is caro data vermibus) is nullius in bonis.” 
2  Though see Mason and Laurie (2001), who suggest that it derives from a misinterpretation of 
precedent. 
3  One should note that this was a criminal case concerned with whether the defendant had 
‘possession’ of a weapon, in this case his hand inside his jacket pocket and held to look as if it was a 
firearm.  The (only) relevant statement comes from Lord Bingham, who, at para. 8, stated: “… One 
cannot possess something which is not separate and distinct from oneself.  An unsevered hand or finger 
is part of oneself.  Therefore, one cannot possess it.  Resort to metaphor is impermissible because 
metaphor is a literary device which draftsmen of criminal statutes do not employ.  What is possessed 
must under the definition be a thing.  A person’s hand or fingers are not a thing.  If they were regarded 
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respect to excised body parts (Skegg, 1975), though in Doodeward v Spence (1908), 
the High Court of Australia recognised third party ownership in a preserved foetus, 
holding that the lawful exercise of skill which gave the foetus attributes different from 
a mere corpse founded a right to proprietary possession.  This ‘attribution of skill’ 
exception found its way to the UK in R v Kelly (1998), wherein the Court of Appeal 
recognised property rights in excised body parts where they had been subjected to 
dissection or preservation, or had otherwise acquired different attributes by the 
application of skill.4  In the recent case of Yearworth and Others v North Bristol NHS 
Trust (2009), the Court of Appeal for England and Wales revisited the property issue.  
This article analyses Yearworth, (1) reviewing the facts and the Court’s decision with 
respect to the originators’ proprietary interests in their body and bodily products, (2) 
considering the significance of relying on property and its use a legal metaphor, (3) 
questioning the scope of the property right created, and (4) querying whether an 
alternate conceptual approach to extending rights and a remedy was warranted.  It 
concludes by considering the precedential value of Yearworth. 
 
BACKGROUND AND DECISION 
 
In Yearworth, six claimants were diagnosed with cancer and consented to 
chemotherapy at the Southmead Hospital.  As the treatment had the possibility of 
rendering them infertile, the hospital, which operated a fertility clinic licensed under 
the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 (HFEA 1990), offered to freeze 
and store samples of each claimant’s semen for his subsequent use.  Each claimant 
agreed and produced a sample.  The agreement resulted in the generation of a Sperm 
Storage Request, a Consent to Storage and Use, and a Sperm Storage for Those 
Undergoing Chemotherapy for each claimant, which contained a variety of 
representations, including some relating to storage and future use.  Following 
completion of the documents, and prior to the use of the sperm, the storage system 
failed, causing the samples to be irreversibly damaged. 
Each claimant alleged that he suffered an adverse or traumatic reaction to the 
news, including mental distress or mild/moderate depression.  The defendant Trust 
admitted that it had a duty to take reasonable care of the sperm and that it had failed to 
do so by neglecting to top up the liquid nitrogen tanks when it knew or ought to have 
known that they required attention.  However, it denied liability, arguing that, even if 
its breach caused injury or distress, the claimants were barred from recovery because 
the loss of sperm was neither a ‘personal injury’ nor ‘damage to property’. 
In the appeal proceedings, the claimants advanced three arguments, namely 
that, due to the Trust’s negligence, they suffered (1) tortious personal injuries, (2) 
tortious damage to property, and (3) losses resulting from breach of bailment 
conditions.5  The decision of the Court was given by Lord Judge CJ (Sir Anthony 
Clarke MR and Wilson LJ concurring). 
On the personal injury claim, the claimants argued that (1) the sperm had been 
inside their bodies, (2) damage to it while inside them would constitute a personal 
injury, (3) its ejaculation makes no difference given that it was not intended to be 
abandoned and it was intended to retain its original biological function and purpose 
                                                                                                                                            
as property for purposes of s. 143 of the 2000 Act, the Court could, theoretically, make an order 
depriving the offender of his rights to them, and they could be taken into the possession of the police.” 
4  This approach was more recently applied in AB v Leeds Teaching Hospital NHS Trust [2004] 
EWHC 644 (QB). 
5  This last claim was argued for the first time in, and at the invitation of, the Court of Appeal. 
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(ie: to fertilise a human egg).  In support of their position, they cited a German case 
which held that bodily parts, including eggs extracted for re-implantation, retained a 
functional unity with the body such that injury to them could constitute physical 
injury, and, although stored sperm would not be re-implanted, it would be illogical for 
the law to treat damage to it differently. 
Lord Judge CJ noted the practical legal constraints which compelled the 
German court to adopt this view (para. 22) and dismissed the personal injury claim 
perfunctorily (para. 23), stating: 
 
23 [I]t would be a fiction to hold that damage to a substance 
generated by a person’s body, inflicted after its removal for storage 
purposes, constituted a bodily or “personal injury” to him. … We must 
deal in realities.  To do otherwise would generate paradoxes, and yield 
ramifications, productive of substantial uncertainty, expensive debate 
and nice distinctions in an area of law which should be simple, and the 
principles clear.  Even if we were to admit [the claimants’ argument], 
the law would swim into deep waters in relation to the continued 
biological activity, and the function, of several other bodily substances 
or parts.  
 
Ultimately, Lord Judge CJ was not convinced that damage to an excised part or 
product – which could no longer be felt – could be characterised as a ‘personal injury 
to the body’, and he seemed concerned with the complexity and uncertainty to which 
a personal injury basis would give rise. 
On the issue of a property right in the sperm, Lord Judge CJ opined that a 
claim for negligent loss of property must be founded on legal ownership or possessory 
title retained by the claimant.  Importantly, and drawing on Rose LJ’s opinion in 
Kelly, Lord Judge CJ explicitly stated that advances in medical science are demanding 
a re-analysis of the common law’s approach to ownership of parts and products of 
living bodies, and he rejected the suggestion that the Human Tissue Act 2004 (HTA 
2004) could be used to confine the common law’s treatment of body parts or products 
as property if the common law rested on a broader basis (para. 38).6  He later stated: 
 
45(d) … [W]e are not content to see the common law in this area 
founded upon the principle in Doodeward, which was devised as an 
exception to a principle, itself of exceptional character, relating to the 
ownership of a human corpse.  Such ancestry does not commend it as a 
solid foundation.  Moreover, a distinction between the capacity to own 
body parts or products which have, and which have not, been subject 
to the exercise of work or skill is not entirely logical. … 
 
While Lord Judge CJ took notice of the HTA 2004, which, in s. 32(9), entrenches the 
Doodeward ‘application of skill’ exception to holding property, he pointed out that it 
was only peripherally relevant because gametes, which, according to s. 53(1), are 
governed by the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 (HFEA 1990), were 
in issue.7  As such, he considered the respective positions of the parties under the 
                                                 
6  In L v Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority and Secretary of State for Health 
[2008] EWHC 2149 (Fam), the Court also stipulated that the common law ‘does not stand still’. 
7  At the time of the case, the 2008 amendments to the HFEA 1990 were not yet in force, but 
none of the amendments would have had any bearing on the case. 
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HFEA 1990: 
 
• The claimants’ alone, through their bodies, generated the sperm, and the sole 
object of the sperm (and its storage) was for the claimants’ subsequent use to 
reproduce (para. 45(f)). 
 
• The HFEA 1990 was designed to give legal effect to principles of good 
practice in modern reproductive medicine, and should not deprive individuals 
of the ability to recover damages for breach of a statutory duty (para. 41). 
 
• One of the pillars of the HFEA 1990 is the stringent requirements around 
informed consent, which make clear that only the claimants have rights in 
relation to the sperm, and the Trust has duties and limitations (para. 44). 
 
• The interjection of the need for third party support (eg: expert storage and 
medical assistance to make subsequent use of the sperm) does not diminish a 
right held by an individual (para. 45(f)). 
 
Noting that the Trust’s actions precluded the claimants from exercising their right, 
Lord Judge CJ held that the claimants had ownership rights in their sperm and could 
sue for interference with those rights. 
Having found that the control the claimants could exercise over their stored 
sperm was sufficient to found a property interest, Lord Judge CJ went on to consider 
bailment, which arises from taking temporary possession of another’s goods, and 
involves an assumption of responsibility for their safe-keeping and return.  Under the 
circumstances, in paras. 48 and 49, Lord Judge CJ held as follows: 
 
• The Trust voluntarily chose to take possession of the sperm, and, though it 
received public funds to support such activities, its bailment was gratuitous 
insofar as the claimants were concerned. 
 
• The Trust acquired exclusive possession of the sperm, and, having accepted 
that possession, undertook certain duties in relation thereto, including careful 
storage. 
 
• The Trust held itself out as having special skills, and, by its own admission, 
failed to employ them appropriately when it allowed the nitrogen levels in the 
storage tank to drop and the storage temperatures to rise. 
 
Lord Judge CJ concluded that a gratuitous bailment existed, and that, in addition to 
being liable under tort for damage to property, the Trust was liable under bailment. 
On the issue of damages for psychological injury, Lord Judge CJ directed that 
each claimant would have to demonstrate that his distress or psychiatric injury was a 
reasonably foreseeable consequence of the breach of duty, whether the duty was 
considered under tort or bailment (para. 54).  He concluded that, while the bailments 
in question were not commercial, they were certainly directed at offering the 
claimants peace of mind with respect to the potential to have children in the future 
where their reproductive capacity was under threat.  As such, the claimants could 
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recover damages if they could prove (1) the foreseeability of mental distress, and (2) 
mental distress in fact.8 
These, then, are the facts and ratio of the case.  But what of the value of this 
decision and what does it really mean for practitioners in the medical law context?  It 
is to this question that we turn in the following sections, first addressing the use of 
property as a remedy-grounding concept, before looking at the possibility of 
alternative foundations for protecting the rights and interests of tissue originators. 
 
PROPERTY AS METAPHOR? 
 
Ironically, one is left wondering what the language of property in Yearworth means 
for those operating in the biomedical setting and the law relating to human bodies, 
tissues and products.  There is very little work in the decision linking the claims to the 
concept of property, and, as shall be addressed below, little more directed at 
elucidating the scope of the rights erected.  On the first issue, one wonders whether 
the language of property in Yearworth is simply being used as a metaphor?9  It would 
seem so from Lord Judge CJ’s comment at paragraph 28: 
 
The concept of ownership is no more than a convenient global 
description of different collections of rights held by persons over 
physical and other things. 
 
However, he never grounds his use of property by clearly articulating the collection of 
rights envisioned or the basis of the extension of rights to the claimants (other than 
that they alone produced the sperm).  As such, it is never made exactly clear what 
property is a metaphor for.  Is it simply a means of extending some level of control to 
actors, including originators of tissue, in the new bio-economy?  Given that most 
people are familiar with the idea of property, broadly conceptualised, and with the 
language of property, is it a means of offering predictability in a novel and highly 
fluid setting?  Or is it simply a pragmatic means of securing justice, of providing a 
remedy, that has been denied to so many tissue originators in the past? 
Lord Judge CJ considers both common law precedents and statutory 
provisions, rejecting and relying on both in turns.  In the end, the rights granted under 
the HFEA 1990, particularly those around consent, seemed persuasive.  So perhaps 
the decision and the use of property is really a metaphor for ‘control’, but again, one 
cannot be sure.  The single short reference to Honoré cites one of the eleven incidents 
of ownership (eg: the right to use) but fails to explore these incidents in any 
systematic way.  Even accepting the reference to Honoré, Lord Judge CJ failed to 
ground his finding of property in any particular moral theory or value, nor did he 
engage meaningfully with the very rich and important bioethical and legal scholarship 
on the subject of property in the human body.  Additionally, he made no broad 
statement of principle other than that the common law must keep pace with medical 
science.  His most telling statement is the following: 
 
28 We have no doubt that, in deciding whether sperm is capable of 
being owned for the purpose which we have identified [future 
                                                 
8  It should be noted that it is not clear from the case whether the claimant must demonstrate the 
manifestation of a psychiatric injury, as is the case in tort. 
9  Recall that, quite simply, metaphors allow us to understand and experience one kind of thing 
in terms of another (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980). 
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functional or reproductive use], part of our inquiry must be into the 
existence or otherwise of a nexus between the incident of ownership 
most strongly demonstrated by the facts of the case (surely here, the 
right, albeit limited, of the men to use the sperm) and the nature of the 
damage consequent upon the breach of the duty of care (here, their 
inability to use it notwithstanding that this was the specific purpose for 
which it was generated). 
 
As such, after reviewing the development of the common law in relation to living 
bodies, corpses, parts of corpses, and parts and products of living bodies, he 
concluded that the claimants alone generated the sperm for the sole purpose of using it 
for their own benefit, and by virtue of the HFEA 1990, the claimants alone could 
order the destruction of the sperm (para. 45). 
At this point, it is worth stating that an inquiry into the metaphor used or 
intended is not a matter of mere academic concern.  On the issue of metaphors, it has 
been claimed that: 
 
… [M]etaphor is but an aesthetically pleasing way of communicating 
meaning that could have been expressed literally.  Metaphor set forth 
by the comparison view is not that metaphor is strictly equivalent to a 
literal expression, but that there is an analogical relation between the 
two parts of the metaphor, i.e. metaphor is an implicit simile (Caenave, 
1979, p. 20). 
 
However, there is a strong argument that metaphors are much more powerful; they are 
not mere comparative tools.  This approach views the metaphor as having cognitive 
value by inextricably intertwining with the legal subject: 
 
… The system of commonplaces or implications attending the 
subsiding subject fosters insight into the principal subject by 
demanding simultaneous awareness of both subjects that is not 
reducible to any mere comparison between the two (Murray, 1975, p. 
288). 
 
In short, the metaphor carries the observer beyond the original subject, contributing to 
the subject in a substantive way. 
Given the decision in Yearworth, the human person – the originator of tissue 
and bodily products – is pulled into the property matrix.  Obviously, there is a certain 
utility associated with the use of property because of the social familiarity we have 
with it.  However, there is also a lot of (negative) baggage associated with the 
property paradigm which then gets associated with (or heaped onto) the person.  In 
particular, its intimacy with materiality, markets, and financial-over-social merit 
makes its extension to the body controversial; the nature of its development creates a 
tendency to instrumentalise, and that is something we generally deplore when it 
comes to the person and the human body.10  Given the controversial nature of the 
property metaphor, it was incumbent on the Court to offer some clarity around what 
                                                 
10  In this regard, see Campbell (2009), who, in ch. 2, argues that the property paradigm is 
dehumanising. 
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questions the use of this metaphor answers and evades (ie: what is the scope of the 
right being created). 
 
SCOPE OF THE PROPERTY RIGHT? 
 
Of the many practical questions that remain unanswered by Yearworth, perhaps the 
most crucial one, again ironically and as noted above, relates to the nature and scope 
of the property right purported to be created.  Because it is not clear what work the 
property paradigm is being asked to fulfil, it is not clear what bundle of property 
rights might have been extended to originators by this decision, nor is the range of the 
circumstances covered by the decision apparent.  What if no documents amounting to 
gratuitous bailment had been involved?  What of the situation where the institution is 
not licensed under the HFEA?  What other rights does the claimant have with respect 
to the tissue other than return for his own agreed functional use?  How far does the 
case and its finding of property go? 
Given the above, including the unresolved foundations and purpose of the 
property finding, we are left to wonder whether the finding of property sounding in a 
cause of action is restricted to gametes and reproductive tissue, or, less restrictively, to 
body products for which there exist written agreements and duties the breach of which 
correlates to the originator’s intended use, or, more expansively, is applicable to tissue 
originators and actors in the biomedical law setting more generally.  Alternatively, 
might Yearworth have wider implications than to the medical law setting, and be 
transformative of tort and contract law more generally as it relates to claims made by 
individuals in relation to their bodies and their parts and products? 
While it might be unfair to pose these questions at this early stage, one might 
expect to discern some indication of the case’s intended scope from the language of 
the decision itself.  Unfortunately, as lamented above, no great statements of principle 
were made or defended, and no great clarity emerges as to the intended scope of the 
rights discussed.  At one point, Lord Judge CJ is careful to state that: 
 
45(b) The present claims relate to products of a living human body 
intended for use by the persons whose bodies have generated them.  In 
these appeals we are not invited to consider whether there is any 
significant difference between such claims and those in which 
products are intended for use by other persons … . 
 
And: 
 
45(f)(v) In reaching our conclusion that the men had ownership 
of the sperm for the purposes of their present claims, we are fortified 
by the precise correlation between the primary, if circumscribed, rights 
of the men in relation to the sperm, namely in relation to its future use, 
and the consequence of the Trust’s breach of duty, namely preclusion 
of its future use. 
 
In short, the Court was careful not to engage with any theoretical or practical 
questions (relating to property and the human body) beyond the narrowly articulated 
facts of the case.  While this is not uncommon in the slow evolution of the common 
law, many will not appreciate the lack of direction for future cases. 
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ALTERNATE METAPHORS? 
 
While the sheer weight and prevalence of property, combined here with the range of 
commercial interests operative in the biomedical setting, makes it difficult to avoid 
the property paradigm, the widespread concern over instrumentalisation and the 
potential negative consequences of propertisation should perhaps prompt us to inquire 
whether an alternative metaphor might have been deployed.  It has been argued that 
(1) the foundation of the (legal) metaphor is the imagination, and (2) the use of 
metaphor in law as a naming vehicle requires that it be grounded in the relevant 
human condition (Murray, 1984).  On the issue of imagination, note the following: 
 
All human rights, laws, and ideals of society were philosophical and 
before that they were not even languaged and therefore not in 
existence.  But somewhere, sometime, someone thought the idea and 
named the law.  When the legal concept grew beyond its ideal stage 
and became public as part of the social psyche, it became a reality.  It 
became the law.  So, too, there are many new ways of living and 
socialising which have not yet become the law, and this is because 
they have not been imagined and languaged into existence.  The 
imagination then is the creative source … of metaphorisations 
(Murray, 1984, p. 723). 
 
With respect to the ‘human condition’ in which the metaphor is properly grounded, 
one might consider the following: the need to promote, and the desire to 
experience/realise, justice, efficiency, democracy and human value in the face of 
quickly evolving biomedical knowledge and practices which increasingly threaten 
traditional views of social and economic propriety and human identity.  Lord Judge 
CJ himself noted the ever-expanding frontiers of medical science and the need for the 
common law, including tort and contract law, to keep pace (paras. 3 and 45(a)). 
Bearing these points in mind – the need for imagination and grounding in the 
social reality – one alternate approach may have been to give greater credence to the 
personal injury basis argued by the claimants.  Obviously, such an approach is not 
without its difficulties, as pointed out by Lord Judge CJ, but a morally grounded 
principle and an intelligently structured and limited rule might have been fashioned 
using ‘personal injury’ as a metaphor. 
By way of (very preliminary) consideration of such an approach, we might, at 
the outset, recognise the following matters: 
 
• gametes (like sperm) have a very personal and unique biological origin and 
function; 
 
• the gametes retained an ongoing function intended to be used if these 
claimants were rendered infertile; 
 
• the claimants saw the sperm as an extension of their living being, and their 
natural inclination may have been to make claims such as, “I made or 
produced that sperm and it is a part of me”; and 
 
• the claimants simply wanted control of that special product and an avenue for 
recovering damages where their interests had been negligently interfered with. 
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Bearing this in mind, the Court might have concluded that the sperm, being a unique 
product which originally formed a unity with the body and subsequently retained its 
function and purpose, remains personal and can be injured in certain limited 
circumstances such that damages are warranted.  While there might be no general 
damages for pain and suffering at its loss (ie: destruction of the sperm would not 
cause pain or injury to the person), there might well be pecuniary losses and losses 
resulting from emotional trauma, again if such was foreseeable and the circumstances 
warrant.  Ultimately, the need for limits and caveats should not necessarily be a bar to 
this approach.  We have, for example, erected all manner of limiting rules around 
rights attending to the foetus (ie: foetuses have an expanding repertoire of rights as it 
comes closer to term, but can only vindicate them if it is born and living and duly 
represented). 
Of course, the personal injury metaphor is not the only alternative metaphor.  
Scotland offers another non-property approach, one based on personality protection: 
 
[R]ights of personality protect the non-patrimonial [non-economic] or 
dignitary aspects of the human person – who a person is rather than 
what a person has.  The concept of rights of personality … was 
…unarticulated, in common law systems until very recently. (Whitty 
and Zimmermann, 2009, p. 3) 
 
Traditionally, the ‘actio injuriarium’11 was available for, inter alia, insults or affronts 
to honour and threats of harm, and was supported by broad understandings of dignity 
(or the desire for the law to promote respect for others’ dignity).  And it is such a 
dignity-based action which might be used to protect interests such as those advanced 
by the claimants in Yearworth (ie: interests in having the life they set for themselves 
protected to some extent, and of having a means of recovery when that life and their 
dignity is infringed by the negligence of others). 
This action was successfully deployed in Stevens v Yorkhill NHS Trust and 
Another (2007), wherein the parent ‘pursuer’12 argued that, despite authorising a post-
mortem on her daughter, it was never explained to her that such post-mortem entailed 
removing and retaining organs.  Her discovery of this led to shock and psychiatric 
injury (ie: severe depression), and, ultimately, to loss of employment.  She argued, 
inter alia, that there exists under Scots common law an action in its own right for 
wrongful interference with a body (in this case a corpse).  On this point, the Court 
considered Pollock v Workmen (1900), Conway v Dalziel (1901), and Hughes v 
Robertson (1913), and noted that they were not superseded by the Human Tissue Act 
1961 or the Human Anatomy Act 1984.  It stated: 
 
43 It would appear … that in addition to supporting the 
proposition that an unauthorised post-mortem can constitute an 
independent legal wrong, the case of Hughes v Robertson also lends 
some support to the line taken in Conway v Dalziel that the removal 
                                                 
11  The term ‘actio injuriarium’, also appearing as ‘actio iniuriarum’, refers to a right of action for 
wrongful conduct resulting in an affront to honour and feelings (or personality), and which entitles the 
victim to claim damages.  It is an old claim received into Scots law from Roman law many centuries 
ago.  For more on this action, see MacQueen (2005) and Reid (2007). 
12  The term ‘pursuer’, in Scots law, refers to the party who initiates a lawsuit with the intent of 
obtaining a legal remedy, and it is the equivalent of ‘plaintiff’ or ‘claimant’ in other jurisdictions. 
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and retention of organs can itself constitute a separate and independent 
legal wrong. 
 
And: 
 
57 [T]he unauthorised post-mortems … disclosed such an 
insensitivity to the feelings of their relatives … that such conduct 
constituted an affront to their dignity as relatives of the deceased so as 
to justify being classed as a civil wrong … . 
 
The Court concluded by considering damages by way of ‘solatium’13: 
 
62  In my opinion Scots law recognises as a legal wrong for which 
damages by way of solatium can be claimed the unauthorised removal 
and retention of organs from a dead body.  The Scottish cases suggest 
that the true juridical basis for this type of claim lies in the actio 
injuriarium. 
 
Ultimately, the Scottish Court acknowledged the existence of an independent action 
based on wrongful interference with (or treatment of) a body (and its parts), which 
action is based on an affront to human dignity (Whitty and Zimmermann, 2009).  The 
pursuer need not engage with the property paradigm. 
The question remains: What might or should dignity mean in this situation? 
One must concede at the outset that the utility of dignity as a legal value has 
been questioned (Feldman, 1999), and it has been described as overly vague 
(Macklin, 2003, Harmon, 2006).  Nonetheless, the value remains popular and widely 
claimed, readily understood (at least in general terms), and clearly of relevance to the 
treatment of human beings and their parts and products (eg: we all wish to generally 
protect and enhance human dignity, for ourselves and others, and to avoid 
instrumentalisations of the person and his/her parts which could be damaging). 
Moreover, its use is in conformity with the burgeoning body of international biolaw 
with respect to the position of the person and the body in the modern biomedical 
setting.14 
While a more precise definition might be (and would need to be) fashioned, 
for present purposes, broadly construed, dignity might capture the idea that persons 
and their desires have value.  It supports mid-level legal principles like autonomy 
(self-rule), privacy (shelter from oversight or interference), and personal identity (or 
the construction of a public persona), which are all reasonably well understood.  
Interestingly, one can already (arguably) detect a movement toward dignity-based 
actions in the negligence jurisprudence.  For example, in McFarlane v. Tayside 
Health Board (2000), a wrongful pregnancy case, the court awarded a sum for the 
wrongful affront to the parent’s autonomy.  In Rees v. Darlington Memorial Hospital 
NHS Trust (2004), dignity was recognised as an important human right.  In Murray v. 
                                                 
13  The term ‘solatium’ refers to claimable damages in a personal injury claim that are ‘non-
patrimonial’, that is damages for emotional distress and/or pain and suffering experienced by the victim 
(as opposed to patrimonial damages, which include more readily quantifiable economic losses): see 
Scottish Law Commission (2008). 
14  In this regard, note the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), the Biomedicine 
Convention (1997), the Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights (1997), the 
Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights (2005), and others. 
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Express Newspapers plc (2008), the court referred to dignity in recognising parental 
rights to control the size of their family 
Ultimately, then, if (originator) control is the interest to be protected, and if a 
remedy for its interference is the objective to be realised, then a non-property 
approach (or metaphor) reliant on negligence but grounded in dignity could be 
imagined.  In the present circumstances, a dignity-based actio injuriarium might 
provide a remedy where, through another’s negligence, one’s life options are 
damaged (or limited) through harm to a functional body product that once formed a 
unity with the claimant.  A Court need not turn to the property metaphor (ie: we need 
not rush into the arms of the property metaphor/maelstrom).  With some imagination, 
alternate metaphors or approaches to control and justice can be articulated, and they 
might be more readily acceptable than property. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
What makes the Yearworth case significant?  Quite simply, it constitutes the first 
instance that an appellate court has seriously considered the question of originator 
property in human material, and it has done so directly where previous courts have 
shied away from the issue.  It has apparently cleared away a controversial piece of 
legal artifice, and extended the right of body-product ownership to originators of 
those products within a certain context/relationship, thereby opening up new remedial 
possibilities. 
What detracts from Yearworth’s significance?  First and foremost, the decision 
is limited to very narrow circumstances (ie: the remedy is limited to persons who 
stored gametes for their own use and these gametes were damaged).  However, more 
importantly, it is wanting on a number of fronts.  Yearworth was ripe for an 
articulation of relationship, and a statement of law, as elegant as that offered by the 
revolutionary decision in Donoghue v Stevenson (1932),15 but it did not offer them.  
Indeed, its lack of value-engagement, opaqueness around the work ‘property’ is 
supposed to perform, and its general absence of statements of general application 
relating to rights and duties, all combine to undermine its general significance. 
Ultimately, one would have hoped for much more from the Court, particularly 
in light of: 
 
• the (precarious) position of the person in modern medical practices (including 
biomedical research); 
 
• the deep and widespread debate about the propriety of empowering the 
individual through the property paradigm; 
 
• the values which must be vindicated in the human life and identity settings 
(including human dignity, autonomy, and equality); and 
 
                                                 
15  Donoghue v Stevenson (1932) was transformative of the common law.  It was immediately 
recognised as a legal turning point with respect to its holding that individuals have duties toward 
persons whom they will never meet but might foresee as being injured by their actions (Pollock, 1933).  
Fifty years post-decision, it was viewed as the “single most important decision in the history of the law 
of torts” (Linden, 1983), and the “most important decision in all the common law” (Smith and Burns, 
1983).  Sixty years post-decision, it was still described as “revolutionary”, having reshaped the law of 
product liability and torts (Ferrari, 1994). 
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• the possibility of securing rights of control and remedies through other means 
(as has been done in Scotland). 
 
In the result, we are left with more questions than answers.  While it engages with, 
and impacts on, important theoretical and practical issues – from legal, healthcare and 
research perspectives – the guidance it offers is minimalist and patchy, and, for that 
reason, its precedential significance is in doubt. 
In the end, we are left to wonder at the potential significance of Yearworth.  It 
may well be both a ‘first step’ and a ‘next step’ in the advance of the property 
paradigm: a ‘first step’ in that it finally extends rights to originators of (at least) 
products, and a ‘next step’ in that it is one more in a long line of cases which chips 
away at the ‘no-property in the human body’ rule.  The scope of the holding will have 
to be tested in future cases where non-reproductive tissue is in question and different 
relationships obtain.  If it has opened the door for tissue originators in a broader way, 
Yearworth may found a new line of cases which will, hopefully, engage more fully 
with the conceptual and ethical elements of the relationships and transactions at issue.  
If this is the case, one might characterise it as transformative of the common law in a 
slow burning sort of way.16  Time will tell. 
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